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Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughter
1.1 Introduction
Globalization—the integration of national economies—has become
one of the most widely used buzzwords of the late twentieth century. It is
frequently given credit or blame for all manner of economic outcomes.
While many signs of globalization are quite obvious, it is hard to say
whether market integration is more important for economic performance
today than it was thirty years ago. But one thing is certain: Few people
have done more to advance our understanding of the manifold dimensions
of economic integration than Robert Lipsey. Lipsey and numerous co-
authors have chronicled market integration in all its dimensions—the be-
havior of relative prices, national price levels, volume ﬂows of traded
goods, and volume ﬂows of foreign direct investment—in as much detail
as anyone (e.g., Lipsey 1963). As a result, much of what we know about the
extent of international economic integration is due to him. In this paper we
try to make a further contribution to that understanding, particularly in
the area of the integration of markets for traded goods.
What drives globalization? In ﬁnancial markets, integration has been
driven by declines in both natural and political trade barriers. For ex-
ample, the proliferation of computer technology has drastically cheapened
trading and communication; at the same time, policy makers have elimi-
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15nated a wide range of restrictions on international capital ﬂows. The re-
sults are clear in terms of both quantities and prices. In 1973 the daily
turnover in worldwide foreign exchange trading averaged about $10 bil-
lion; today this quantity has increased more than a hundredfold to well
over $1 trillion. And across many countries, covered interest parity holds
much more closely today than it did twenty years ago. In light of this evi-
denceonbothquantitiesandprices,thereisaconsensusthatﬁnancialmar-
kets are much more integrated today than they were twenty years ago.
Many of the same forces driving ﬁnancial market integration have also
been operating in goods markets, so it is tempting to conclude that product
markets have integrated as well. Natural trade barriers have fallen with
improvements in transportation such as supertankers and wide-body jets.
On the political side, successive General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT) rounds have greatly reduced tariﬀs on manufactures and have
expanded the scope of liberalization to many nonmanufacturing sectors as
well. In addition to multilateral liberalization, many countries have also
lowered barriers through regional arrangements such as the European
Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Other factors have been working against product-market integration,
however. First, the many regional trading blocs that have formed in recent
years can divert trade as well as create it. Second, as tariﬀ barriers have
declined, many countries have increasingly resorted to nontariﬀ barriers
(NTBs) to impede trade. Arrangements such as the Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment (MFA) and “voluntary” export restraints in the U.S. automobile
market have proliferated. The aggressive use of antidumping laws to pro-
tect domestic industries is common in the United States and Europe. Re-
cent complaints levied by U.S. steel makers remind us of the importance
of these tools in restricting the ﬂow of goods and distorting prices. Rough
measures of the existence of NTBs, such as coverage ratios, are available,
but these measures do little to gauge the extent to which NTBs actually
inhibit trade. Unlike tariﬀ rates, they do not tell us how great a wedge is
created between prices of similar goods in diﬀerent markets. Overall, with
the decline of natural trade barriers and tariﬀs on the one hand and the
rise of regional blocs and NTBs on the other, it is diﬃcult to say a priori
just how much more integrated product markets have become in recent
years.1
In this paper we present some new price- and quantity-based measures
of product-market integration. Documenting trends in market integration
is interesting in itself; but it will also help us understand the link between
1. Widely available volume measures, such as trade/GDP ratios, may really reﬂect some-
thing about the nature of economic growth rather than the integration of product markets.
Harrigan (1993) provides direct evidence on how much trade barriers reduce import volumes.
Using a 1983 sample of OECD countries, he ﬁnds that tariﬀs and transportation costs reduce
import volumes much more than NTBs do.
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grow faster as their product markets become more connected to those of
other countries? Has product-market integration contributed to rising in-
come inequality in countries? By studying product-market integration in
multiple dimensions—across countries, industries, and time—we hope to
assemble some facts on integration that will permit more powerful tests of
the impact of integration on national economic performance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the process of
economic integration and its implications for economic outcomes. Section
1.3 presents our data and framework for analyzing product price evidence
on integration. Section 1.4 presents our data and framework for analyzing
quantity evidence on integration. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Perspectives on Economic Integration
Before discussing the conceptual issues that underlie the measurement
of product-market integration, it is worth remembering why we care about
this integration in the ﬁrst place. Economic integration has many conse-
quences for the operation of a market economy. First, it can aﬀe c ta ne c o n -
omy’s response to monetary and ﬁscal policies. In each case, tighter con-
nections between domestic and foreign markets can reduce the potency of
conventional demand stimuli. For example, increased lending by domes-
tic banks or increased spending by domestic consumers may be directed
at foreign ﬁrms. Second, greater integration can allow external factors to
exert greater inﬂuence on domestic outcomes. For example, increased
product-market competition from less developed countries might be con-
tributing to the ongoing rise in the U.S. skill premium. The exact degree
to which economic integration aﬀects domestic outcomes remains open to
speculation, however. In part, this is because we have only rough metrics
by which to measure the extent of integration, especially in product mar-
kets. Our paper aims to provide some new measures.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to proceed in measuring product-
market integration. One approach would be to assemble direct evidence
on the magnitude of barriers between national markets. Included here
would be shipping costs, tariﬀs, and any other barriers that make costly
the international movement of goods. In general, we expect the degree of
market integration to vary inversely with the magnitude of these barriers.
Available data on tariﬀ rates and transport costs certainly conﬁrm the
view that markets have become more integrated in recent years. Figure 1.1
presents some evidence of declining U.S. barriers. Average tariﬀ rates cover
all U.S. manufacturing imports; each year’s rate measures the total tariﬀ
revenue collected, divided by the value of all dutiable imports. Average
transportation costs also cover all U.S. manufacturing; each year’s rate
measures the cost, insurance, and freight for all U.S. imports, divided by
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from Feenstra (1996). As ﬁgure 1.1 shows, average U.S. tariﬀs and trans-
portation costs have generally been declining the past twenty years. This
suggests that U.S. product markets have become more integrated with
world markets.
These direct measures of integration are suggestive, but they face at
least three important limitations. First, these ex post measures omit the
cost of prohibitive barriers—that is, tariﬀs or transportation costs that are
so high that U.S. imports are zero. Second, these tariﬀ measures completely
omit all NTBs. This matters because NTBs, both intended and unin-
tended, are now the primary barriers between countries in many product
categories. Third, even if NTB data were readily available they likely could
not be easily quantiﬁed as a cost of moving goods. Details of NTBs vary
so much by product that it would be hard to systematically assemble such
information. On all counts, these measures may overstate the degree of
product-market integration.
These limitations suggest the need for an alternative approach to mea-
suring economic integration. This is to examine equilibrium outcomes—
the prices and quantities generated in various markets—to see if they are
consistent with a marked change in the magnitude of barriers separating
national markets for goods. For example, price equalization for a good
would suggest that trade barriers for that good had been eliminated. This
is the approach we use in this paper.
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Fig. 1.1 Declining U.S. trade barriers
Source: Feenstra (1996).
Note: Data cover all U.S. manufacturing. Tariﬀ rate is deﬁned as total manufacturing duties
collected divided by total manufacturing free on board (f.o.b.) imports. Transportation cost
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between total manufacturing imports valued cost, insurance,
freight (c.i.f.) and f.o.b. divided by total manufacturing f.o.b. imports.One advantage of this approach is that, relative to measuring barriers,
measuring outcomes oﬀers more hope for comparability of data across
countries, product categories, and time, thanks in part to the eﬀorts of
Robert Lipsey through initiatives such as the International Comparisons
Program (ICP) and the NBER World Trade Flows Database. For eﬀorts
to measure globalization across lots of dimensions, this advantage is par-
ticularly important. One disadvantage of this approach is it does not link
outcomes back to barriers. Without these links one cannot rule out the
possibility that changes in outcomes are caused by forces other than de-
clining barriers, such as economic growth. Increased trade ﬂows among a
set of countries might be caused by declining trade barriers. As Helpman
(1987) has shown, however, it might also be caused by convergence of
country incomes—which in turn may be caused by forces such as techno-
logical convergence or factor accumulation. We acknowledge this disad-
vantage of outcome-based measures, yet point out that for many important
issues, outcome-based integration matters regardless of the cause(s). For
example, if changes in a country’s relative product prices are raising do-
mestic wage inequality, that outcome is the same for workers whether it is
caused by reduced transportation costs or by growth abroad.
To date, most descriptions of product-market integration have focused
on trade volumes rather than on trade prices.2 However, in standard mod-
els, trade beneﬁts a country both by compelling its producers to reallocate
resources across industries and by presenting its consumers with an im-
proved range of options. The mechanism that generates these gains is a
change in the vector of traded-goods prices facing the country. As these
prices come to match those of the world, a country beneﬁts by specializing
in its comparative-advantage goods and exporting them in exchange for
the rest of the world’s comparative-advantage goods. The potential beneﬁts
of facing world prices are not limited to these gains from reallocating re-
sources. At least three additional gains from facing world prices arise in
some models: reduced market power for ﬁrms and thus smaller price-cost
margins in the imperfect-competition models from new trade theory,
higher ﬁrm productivity via reduced X-ineﬃciencies, and greater capital
accumulation. Thus, trade theory makes clear that an important—if not
the most important—aspect of goods-market integration is facing world
prices of traded goods.
While it may be true that prices carry the important economic signals
associated with increased market integration, it is also true that in most
cases, these signals will lead ﬁrms and consumers to make new allocation
decisions. The patterns of production and consumption (and thus, of im-
ports and exports) are almost certain to change in concert with the change
2. See, e.g., Krugman (1995) or Irwin (1996). Another popular strain of the literature on
integration relies on gravity models of trade volumes.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 19in prices. Therefore, it is of great interest to look at quantity data as well
in assessing the changing extent of economic integration across countries.
Given our decision to measure integration with price and quantity out-
comes, it is important to clarify how reductions in natural and political
trade barriers change these equilibrium outcomes. To do this we outline
these changes from two alternative perspectives. The ﬁrst is the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model, in which the key determinant of trade is
international diﬀerences in relative factor endowments. In the textbook
two-good setup, we imagine that one country specializes in cars and the
other in shirts, and that they trade to satisfy their preferences. When barri-
ers fall, countries specialize more in production (production becomes more
dissimilar across the countries) and trade more with each other. Our sec-
ond perspective also presumes endowment diﬀerences, but here the prod-
uct space actually evolves as a result of the opportunity to trade. The pro-
duction of the car may become fragmented into the production of car
components. The country that specializes in shirts may now make the fab-
ric for the car seats. The country that specializes in cars may now make the
machines that make shirts. We call this second model HO plus production
fragmentation.3 Feenstra (1998, 13) describes this model as characterized
by “the increased use of imported [intermediate] inputs, and narrowing of
production activities within each country.”
In both models, declining trade barriers permit production reorganiza-
tion according to comparative advantage. In the standard model, there is
no real distinction between “industries” and “activities.” In the modiﬁed
model, the distinction is quite important. Specialization occurs on the ba-
sis of comparative advantage in activities. This distinction matters because
data are organized by industry, rather than activity. As a result, the normal
patterns of specialization by industry, which seem natural from the per-
spective of the standard HO model, may not arise in the data if vertical
specialization is occurring within industries according to activity. In the
rest of this section we brieﬂy discuss these diﬀerences. We start with prices.
First, consider prices charged to various destination markets by export-
ers in a particular source country. With integration, price dispersion across
destination markets should decline over time in the standard HO world.
This follows from the law of one price (LOP). As barriers preventing cross-
country arbitrage decline, a particular source country must charge increas-
ingly uniform prices to destination markets. In the HO-fragmentation
world, things are less clear because integration can change the activity
composition of exports. For example, initially a country might export fully
3. What we are calling “fragmentation” has been labeled diﬀerently by various authors:
“kaleidoscope comparative advantage” (Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994), “slicing the value
chain” (Krugman 1995), and “delocalization” (Leamer 1998).
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tially assembled cars to certain markets and fully assembled cars to other
markets. If there are destination-speciﬁc diﬀerences in goods arising as a
result of specialization by activity, then price dispersion across destina-
tions need not decline. In fact, it could easily increase.
Second, consider relative price structure for producer goods within each
country. With integration, the relative price structure should become more
similar across countries over time in the standard HO world. Again, this
follows from the LOP. But in the HO-fragmentation world, relative pro-
ducer prices need not become more similar across countries. Industry-level
producer prices might actually become less similar across countries as the
mix of activities within each industry becomes less similar across coun-
tries, thanks to greater specialization by activity.
Third, consider relative consumer prices for ﬁnal goods (across all in-
dustries) within each country. If consumers worldwide share similar tastes
for consumption in terms of industries, then integration should make these
relative prices more similar across countries. Note that this is true even
from the HO-fragmentation perspective. Within-industry activities matter
in price dispersion for intermediate goods, but not for ﬁnal goods.
We now consider how integration from these two perspectives aﬀects
quantities of both trade and production. In a multilateral world, with ei-
ther standard HO or HO-fragmentation we expect to see rising trade “inci-
dence” in terms of the frequency of bilateral trade ﬂows for each industry.
However, in the standard HO world all this trade would be interindustry
trade, whereas in the HO-fragmentation world much of it would be intrain-
dustry trade of activities within industries.
Production patterns should also look diﬀerent across the two perspec-
tives. In the standard HO world, if countries focus production on compar-
ative-advantage industries, then the vector of output shares should grow
more dissimilar across countries over time for given factor endowments.
In the HO-fragmentation world, however, the product mix might grow
more similar across countries over time. Consider the example of automo-
bile production for these two cases. With integration in the standard HO
model, countries with a comparative advantage in automobiles would in-
crease their automobile shares of domestic production, while countries
with a comparative disadvantage would reduce their automobile shares.
But in the HO-fragmentation world, most (perhaps all) countries move
into some aspect of car production: Diﬀerent countries focus on diﬀerent
activities, but many might have at least some output in the car industry.
Another diﬀerent feature of the HO-fragmentation world is that the share
of domestic value added in industry gross output might fall across indus-
tries and countries as countries increasingly rely on imported intermediate
inputs. The standard HO world does not carry this prediction.
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less clear for the HO-fragmentation model than for the standard HO
model. While this is not a new idea, it is an important empirical consider-
ation because most readily available international data are at high enough
levels of aggregation to mask particular activities. Feenstra (1998) provides
rich anecdotal and systematic evidence that production fragmentation has
increased in recent years.
1.3 Evidence from Prices
The absolute version of the LOP provides one natural benchmark for
assessing the integration of markets. Presumably, globalization would re-
duce the magnitude of deviations from the LOP. Another benchmark
might involve relative prices: Globalization should force countries to face
increasingly similar relative-price vectors for traded goods. This deﬁnition
might be attractive in instances in which misalignments of exchange rates
might generate substantial short-run deviations from the absolute or rela-
tive LOP.
The usefulness of these benchmarks is limited by data constraints, how-
ever. There are no comprehensive data on local-currency prices of identi-
cal products across countries. Thus, any attempt to measure integration
using product prices will typically require a compromise in one of the three
dimensions emphasized previously: comprehensiveness, unit of measure
(e.g., comparing measures such as indexes whose levels are arbitrary), or
product diﬀerentiation. Although much research has tested the relative
LOP (e.g., Kravis and Lipsey 1977), most of this work says nothing about
the changing degree of integration. Somewhat ironically, the movement
from segmented to integrated markets would appear in the data as a depar-
ture from the relative LOP (or, alternatively, as pricing-to-market). In gen-
eral, it is diﬃcult to study price convergence with indexes—which contain
no information about price levels.
1.3.1 The Behavior of Deviations from the Law of One Price
It may seem obvious that deviations from the LOP should be decreasing
as markets integrate, but it is less clear whether absolute or relative (i.e.,
percentage) deviations from the LOP are what matters. Therefore, it is
worth considering what price dispersion actually reveals about integration.
Theoretically, price discrimination across markets arises as a result of
(1) diﬀerences in demand characteristics across groups of consumers (in
our case, the groups refer to countries) and (2) the ability of ﬁrms to ex-
ploit diﬀerences in demand because of costs of resale across markets. Our
deﬁnition of increased market integration is that the costs of resale are
falling relative to other costs in the economy, either because nations have
reduced barriers to the free ﬂow of goods across borders or because trans-
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nitions of price discrimination and market integration have important con-
sequences for measurement and interpretation.
First, it is important to recognize that the degree of price dispersion we
observe in the data is not purely a function of market integration. Varia-
tion in demand elasticities due to underlying variation in fundamentals
such as income, exchange rates, or availability of substitutes can give rise
to variation in price dispersion as well. Unfortunately, the precise link be-
tween these fundamental factors and the dispersion in demand elasticities
is likely to be quite complicated and diﬃcult to discern in the amount of
data we have available. We will make no explicit attempt to control for
them, but merely note their potential impact on our ﬁndings.
Second, it is important to account for the fact that resale costs may be
rising in nominal terms, but falling relative to other costs. Ideally, we
would like to know whether the permissible range of price dispersion is
rising or falling relative to the product price itself. To capture this concept
we will use the coeﬃcient of variation (CV), which equals the standard
deviation of the prices across countries within a given period divided by
the mean of prices across countries for that period. A falling CV will be
interpreted as falling resale costs and increased integration.
We study the dispersion of prices across markets and over time for four
diﬀerent types of price data: German export unit values, U.S. export unit
values, the Big Mac, and The Economist. Each of these samples has nomi-
nal prices, converted if necessary into units of a common currency. The
data samples vary in the length of time they span (German data, 1975–87;
U.S. data, 1973–87; Big Mac data, 1986–97; The Economist data, 1967–91)
and the destinations they include, although in general these data measure
prices in OECD countries only. It is more diﬃcult to get comparable price
data in nominal currency units for many of the less developed economies.
For evidence on integration between the developed and less developed
countries, which has arguably been a more important phenomenon in re-
cent decades, we will turn to quantity data in the next section.
Table 1.1 reports the estimated linear trend in the CVs calculated for
each of sixteen U.S. export unit value series from 1973 to 1987. For each
industry, the CV is calculated for each year across the set of destinations
in the sample. Then the time series of CVs for that industry are regressed
on a constant and a linear time trend. The cross section of destination
markets includes between ﬁve and eight countries, typically including Can-
ada, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, plus one or more other
European markets. Because the set of destinations is not ﬁxed across prod-
ucts, the variation in results across industries may partly reﬂect variation
4. It is important to measure resale costs relative to other costs in order to abstract from
the eﬀects of inﬂation.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 23in the markets in the sample. If price dispersion were declining steadily,
we would expect the regression to yield a negative coeﬃcient. In fact, only
four of the sixteen estimates are negative and only two of them are signiﬁ-
cant at conventional levels. About four of the positive coeﬃcients are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.
Table 1.2 reports the analogous regressions for twenty-nine German ex-
port industries from 1975 to 1987. The cross section of destinations is simi-
lar to that in the U.S. sample, except that the United States replaces Ger-
many as a destination in each industry. In this sample, a small majority of
cases (sixteen out of twenty-nine) show a declining trend, although only
ﬁve t-statistics are below 2.20, which is required for statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test with eleven degrees of
freedom. In contrast, nine out of thirteen positive coeﬃcients are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. One factor that may help explain the number of signiﬁ-
cant positive coeﬃcients in this set of regressions is the overvaluation of
the dollar in the second half of the data sample. In general, deutsche mark
prices of shipments to the United States rose sharply relative to the
deutsche mark prices of shipments to other markets during the dollar’s
rise from 1980 to 1985. However, we obtained similar qualitative results
when we repeated the regressions excluding the United States from the
sample of German export destinations. Therefore, it is clear that the over-
valuation of the dollar was not by itself responsible for the signiﬁcant trend
increase in price dispersion across German export markets.
Table 1.1 Trends in U.S. Export-Price Dispersion, 1973–1987
Industry Trend Std. Error t-Statistic
Aluminum foil 0.0383 0.0039 9.78
Aluminum oxide 0.0274 0.0111 2.47
Integrated circuit 0.0068 0.0053 1.28
Kraft linerboard paper 0.0036 0.0020 1.77
Autos, over 8 cylinders 0.0108 0.0043 2.51
Primary cell batteries 0.0071 0.0203 0.35
Photocopier paper 0.0040 0.0067 0.60
Putty 0.0054 0.0048 1.14
Cigarettes 0.0102 0.0015 6.74
Industrial lacquers 0.0097 0.0059 1.63
Nitrile rubber 0.0053 0.0056 0.96
Raw cotton 0.0060 0.0059 1.02
Autos, under 8 cylinders 0.0023 0.0012 1.92
Titanium dioxide 0.0162 0.0128 1.26
Bourbon whiskey 0.0086 0.0035 2.47
Yellow corn 0.1880 0.0320 5.87
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: Each trend is the coeﬃcient estimate of annual export-price dispersion regressed on a
time trend. Annual export-price dispersion is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation in
bilateral U.S. export unit values across all destination markets. Each regression contains four-
teen observations.
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in each case the data are based on unit values of shipments. The unit-value
data are susceptible to quality change. If product varieties have become
more specialized in a destination-speciﬁc manner over time, this may ac-
count for increasing dispersion in unit values (see Lipsey 1963 for a de-
tailed analysis of these issues). Arbitrage forces are not as strong when
product substitutability is low. While there are no comprehensive data on
identical products, it is quite easy to get price data for the Big Mac and
The Economist (cover or newsstand price) on a local-currency basis for a
number of markets.
While Big Macs and The Economist do not strike people as classic “trad-
ables”forwhichtradearbitragesawayinternationalpricediﬀerentials,there
Table 1.2 Trends in German Export-Price Dispersion, 1975–1987
Industry Trend Std. Error t-Statistic
Aluminum oxide 0.0080 0.0086 0.92
Autos, 1.5 to 2-liter 0.0095 0.0024 3.94
Autos, 2 to 3-liter 0.0058 0.0012 4.65
Autos, over 3-liter 0.0091 0.0044 2.07
Glykocides 0.0052 0.0045 1.16
Induction furnaces 0.0169 0.0065 2.60
Record players 0.0136 0.0077 1.78
Razor blades 0.0055 0.0044 1.24
Pneumatic tires 0.0005 0.0021 0.22
Platinum plating 0.0117 0.0021 5.51
Aluminum hydroxide 0.0087 0.0034 2.52
Autos, under 1.5-liter 0.0193 0.0069 2.80
Titanium pigment 0.0143 0.0033 4.28
Titanium dioxide 0.0052 0.0087 0.60
Aldehyde derivatives 0.0211 0.0207 1.02
Hydrocarbons 0.0066 0.0055 1.19
Hydrogen 0.0080 0.0022 3.67
Vitamin A 0.0197 0.0078 2.54
Vitamin C 0.0022 0.0023 0.94
Beer 0.0081 0.0023 3.48
Synthetic dyes 0.0026 0.0027 0.97
Special dyes 0.0090 0.0026 3.41
Glazed ceramic tiles 0.0021 0.0030 0.72
Calcium 0.0234 0.0099 2.36
Olive oil 0.0064 0.0045 1.42
Sandals 0.0332 0.0047 7.08
Semi-ﬁnished platinum 0.0059 0.0036 1.63
Cocoa powder 0.0013 0.0045 0.29
Women’s blouses 0.0322 0.0048 6.69
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Note: Each trend is the coeﬃcient estimate of annual export-price dispersion regressed on a
time trend. Annual export-price dispersion is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation in
bilateral German export unit values across all destination markets.
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as a result of market integration. First, many of the inputs used in produc-
ing a Big Mac(ﬂour, beef) or a magazine (paper) arein fact tradable goods.
As these prices converge across countries, prices of the ﬁnal goods should
as well. Second, if product-market integration induces factor-price conver-
gence across countries, then we have further reason to think the prices of
these goods might converge across markets.
What do these data show us about price dispersion? Results for the Big
Mac prices are reported in table 1.3 for three diﬀerent samples. The ﬁrst
sample uses prices from twelve diﬀerent markets, but excludes the 1987
observation (which is missing for half of these markets). The regression
shows a slight, but insigniﬁcant, tendency for dispersion to fall over time
for the ten annual data points. If we restrict the sample to the six markets
for which prices are available in all eleven periods, there is an increase in
the estimated convergence trend, but the coeﬃcient is still not statistically
signiﬁcant. Finally, if we exclude the United States from the sample of six,
the remaining ﬁve markets—Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the
Netherlands, and Germany—do show a signiﬁcant trend toward lower
dispersion. This might be expected since European integration is taking
hold over this period and exchange rates are perhaps more tightly linked.
Results for The Economist are shown in table 1.4. These data cover the
longest time span of any of our data: 1967 to 1991. The whole sample of
eleven markets shows little evidence of trend. This result does not change
markedly when the United States is excluded. When the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Ireland are removed from the sample, the remaining
set of European and Scandinavian markets does show some tendency to-
ward reduced dispersion. If we restrict the sample of countries to the same
six used for the Big Mac, we see signiﬁcantly lower dispersion over time.
What do we take away from the reported evidence on price dispersion?
Basically, that there is little evidence in the data that product markets in
developed economies have become more closely linked in the 1970s and
1980s. That may be a result of the fact that this set of countries was already
fairly integrated by the 1970s. We do note that with the Big Mac and The
Table 1.3 Trends in Price Convergence for the Big Mac, 1986–1997
Country Group Trend Std. Error t-Statistic
Big Mac 12 0.0014 0.0023 0.62
Big Mac 6 0.0029 0.0026 1.14
Big Mac 5 0.0069 0.0020 3.44
Source: The Economist, various issues.
Note: Each trend is the coeﬃcient estimate of annual price dispersion regressed on a time
trend. Annual price dispersion is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation in Big Mac prices
across all countries in the country group. Country groups are deﬁned in the text.
26 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. SlaughterEconomist there is some evidence that countries in Europe may be more
closely linked today than they were ten or twenty years ago. This is not sur-
prising.
1.3.2 The Behavior of Relative Prices
Our second approach to looking for integration of national economies
in price data is to examine whether countries seem to be converging toward
a common set of internal relative prices. This approach is appropriate for
two reasons. First, resource-allocation decisions within a country are a
function of relative prices. Second, the best source of information on inter-
nal relative prices for fairly detailed product categories is found in the In-
ternational Comparisons Program data. This collection eﬀort was spear-
headed by a group of scholars that included Robert Lipsey.
While the ICP data exist in principle for many countries at ﬁve-year
intervals from 1970 to the present, we were only able to obtain the data
for 1975, 1980, and 1985. We focus on the two endpoints and ask whether
the relative prices within countries are converging toward a common
benchmark. This requires a choice of benchmark. Ideally one would like
a “world price” that would prevail in an open market, but by deﬁnition,
this does not exist. Instead, we pick individual countries as a benchmark:
ﬁrst the United States, then Germany.
To measure variation relative to the base country, we ﬁrst normalize the
data by multiplying each country’s price for a given product by the recipro-
cal of the base-country price of that product. This is done for all products,
ensuring that the price vector for the base country is a vector of ones. For
each other country in the sample, we compute the coeﬃcient of variation
of the prices across individual products. If the country has a relative price
structure identical to that of the base country, the CV will equal zero, since
the price vector will be a constant. Speciﬁcally, each element of the price
vector for a particular country would be equal to the exchange rate (local
currency per unit of base-country currency) between the particular coun-
Table 1.4 Trends in Price Convergence for The Economist, 1961–1991
Country Group Trend Std. Error t-Statistic
Economist 11 0.0003 0.0010 0.25
Economist 10 0.0005 0.0010 0.47
Economist 8 0.0014 0.0008 1.77
Big Mac 6 0.0049 0.0012 4.01
Big Mac 5 0.0028 0.0014 1.94
Source: The Economist, various issues.
Note: Each trend is the coeﬃcient estimate of annual price dispersion regressed on a time
trend. Annual price dispersion is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation in prices of The
Economist across all countries in the country group. Country groups are deﬁned in the text.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 27try and the base country that prevailed for this set of products. Since that
exchange rate need not equal the actual market exchange rate, prices in
the two countries need not be equal to have a common relative price struc-
ture.5 On the other hand, as prices within a country depart from the cross-
category mean price, the CV rises.
Table 1.5 reports the CV of internal relative prices for seventeen coun-
tries in 1975 and 1985 benchmarked against the U.S. relative price struc-
ture. The CV is calculated for two separate groupings of goods—producer
goods and consumer goods—and for the total.6 The measure for producer
goods is based on a sample of only three products and should be judged
accordingly. The cross-country variation in the CVs seems to correlate with
stages of economic development. Most developed countries in the sample
have lower CVs than the less developed countries.7 This might reﬂect the
diﬀerent degrees of nontraded services included in product prices, espe-
cially for certain consumer goods.
Turning to the time dimension of the U.S.-benchmarked sample, there
is a large decline in the calculated CVs between 1975 and 1985 for Korea
and India, and to a lesser extent for Japan, Belgium, and France. This
suggests some convergence toward common relative prices between the
United States and these countries. On the other hand, the CVs for the
Philippines and Thailand increase by large amounts between the two peri-
ods, suggesting a movement toward more diverse relative prices vis-a `-vis
the United States. Overall, this relative-price evidence shows that linkages
are much closer between the United States and the other developed coun-
tries than they are between the United States and developing countries.
Furthermore, the big movements in relative prices suggest either conver-
gence or roughly no change with respect to some developed countries,
while there are signs of convergence and divergence with respect to the set
of developing countries.
Turning to the German-benchmarked sample (see table 1.6), one feature
that stands out is how small the CVs are vis-a `-vis other continental Euro-
pean countries. It seems that relative prices within Europe were already
quite close to the relative prices in Germany. The only notable changes
5. It is easy to imagine how a sudden currency swing might cause systematic violations in
the law of one price without necessarily altering the relative price structure between two
markets.
6. Note that the CV for the total is not equal to the average of the two subgroups. This is
primarily because the two subgroups may have diﬀerent means. Looking within the subgroup
does not capture this additional source of change in the overall coeﬃcient of variation.
7. The raw data also reveal another interesting feature: The less developed countries tend
to have higher relative prices for producer vs. consumer goods relative to the United States.
Other developed countries’ distortions relative to U.S. prices seem to be unrelated to the
broad groupings of producer and consumer goods. We note that some of the developing
countries (e.g., Poland) had extensive government intervention in product markets during
our sample period. That said, however, we have chosen to include countries with available
data without making judgments about this issue.
28 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. SlaughterTable 1.5 Dispersion in National Relative Prices Relative to U.S. Relative Prices
1975 1985
All Consumer Producer All Consumer Producer
Country Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods
Austria 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.18
Belgium 0.28 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19
Denmark 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.28
France 0.26 0.28 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.20
Germany 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.16
India 0.69 0.79 0.07 0.42 0.41 0.13
Ireland 0.33 0.36 0.15 0.31 0.33 0.27
Italy 0.30 0.31 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.20
Japan 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.15
Kenya 0.47 0.42 0.20 0.46 0.48 n.a.
Korea 0.76 0.83 0.20 0.38 0.39 0.34
Netherlands 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.29 0.31 0.18
Philippines 0.61 0.61 0.20 0.88 0.36 1.02
Poland 0.37 0.41 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.41
Spain 0.26 0.25 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.22
Thailand 0.48 0.42 0.12 0.60 0.47 0.16
United Kingdom 0.35 0.38 0.06 0.30 0.31 0.26
Source: International Comparisons Program, from World Bank (1993).
Note: Each cell reports the coeﬃcient of variation in the country’s price basket. For each product, price
levels have been normalized worldwide such that the U.S. price equals one. n.a.  not available.
Table 1.6 Dispersion in National Relative Prices Relative to German Relative Prices
1975 1985
All Consumer Producer All Consumer Producer
Country Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods Goods
Austria 0.22 0.19 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.14
Belgium 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.05
Denmark 0.18 0.16 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.27
France 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.05
India 0.61 0.69 0.14 0.58 0.63 0.26
Ireland 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.21
Italy 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.11
Japan 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.03
Kenya 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 n.a.
Korea 0.96 1.03 0.30 0.48 0.51 0.40
Netherlands 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.08
Philippines 0.60 0.61 0.37 0.97 0.48 1.09
Poland 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.46 0.47 0.39
Spain 0.44 0.48 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.20
Thailand 0.49 0.52 0.16 0.73 0.69 0.27
United Kingdom 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.20
United States 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.14
Source: International Comparisons Program, from World Bank (1993).
Note: Each cell reports the coeﬃcient of variation in the country’s price basket. For each product, price
levels have been normalized worldwide such that the German price equals one. n.a.  not available.among this set of countries were declines by Austria and Italy. Price disper-
sion is somewhat greater vis-a `-vis the United Kingdom and Ireland, with
only slight declines in the CVs over the decade. Looking outside European
markets, we see that CVs declined markedly for Japan, Kenya, Korea, and
the United States. They rose for the Philippines, Poland, and Thailand.
This evidence seems broadly consistent with what was observed in the U.S.
sample. Relative prices are much more similar within the developed econo-
mies, and the main tendency among developed markets is toward further
convergence of prices. However, with developing countries, we see cases of
both convergence and divergence over this decade.
Taken together, the totality of price evidence we have examined here
points to increased linkages between the developed economies over recent
decades, especially within the European markets, which were already quite
closely integrated with each other. It is more diﬃcult to tell what the price
evidence says about integration between developed and developing coun-
tries, partly due to lack of data. For the data we have at present, the results
are mixed.
1.4 Evidence from Quantities
1.4.1 Market “Thickness”: Evidence from Trade Flows
Our ﬁrst quantity-based integration measure looks at how “thick” prod-
uct markets are in terms of breadth of trade ﬂows. Deﬁne the categorical
variable Zijkt to be equal to one if country j has some positive value of
exports to country k in industry i during year t, and zero otherwise. If
there are N countries in the world at time t, then for each industry i there
c a nb eu pt o[ ( N)  (N  1)] total bilateral trade ﬂows. One possible
measure of market “thickness” might be the share of total possible bilat-
eral trade ﬂows for which trade actually happens. This thickness measure
can be calculated for each industry-year as follows:
(1) it
j k j ijkt
t
Z














By construction, the thickness measure it ranges from zero to one and
reports the share of total possible bilateral trade “hits” in which trade
actually happened. If every (no) country-pair worldwide has two-way
trade in industry i at time t, then it equals one (zero). We interpret higher
values of it to indicate a thicker world market. In accounting for the inci-
dence of trade (i.e., because Zijkt is categorical), note that this measure
does not incorporate any information about trade volumes. Given this
property, we intend for this measure to capture the competitiveness of
product markets under the assumption that competitiveness depends “on
30 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughterthe margin” on the incidence of trade regardless of the volume of that
trade. We hypothesize that globalization might increase market thickness
over time, insofar as lower trade barriers permit more bilateral trade hits.
Of course, lower barriers might have countervailing eﬀects as well: If na-
tional production mixes become more specialized, for some industries
there might be fewer exporters and thus fewer bilateral trade hits. What-
ever the case, we think the it measure is informative.
To construct it we use the world trade data in Feenstra, Lipsey, and
Bowen (1997). These data cover thirty-four manufacturing industries (as
deﬁned by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) from 1970 through 1992.
We try two diﬀerent sets of countries: the twenty-four original OECD
countries, and “the world” deﬁned as 122 countries with trade data avail-
able for all twenty-three years of the sample. In addition, each observation
of it from the world group of countries is decomposed into four com-
ponents: exports from an OECD country to another OECD country (oo);
exports from an OECD country to a non-OECD country (on); exports
from a non-OECD country to an OECD country (no); and exports from
a non-OECD country to a non-OECD country (nn). That is, for each in-
dustry-year observation of the world sample:
(2)  it ioot iont inot innt                . = +++
Each of the four components is constructed by varying the countries j and
k in Zijkt. For example, for iont the set of j exporting countries is the OECD
and the set of k importing countries is the non-OECD. By keeping N 
122 for all four components we end up with equation (2). With this decom-
position, we can see how changes in it are accounted for by major coun-
try groupings.8
Table 1.7 reports some summary statistics for the OECD sample, the
world sample, and the four components of the world sample. Note that on
average, markets are much thicker within the OECD sample than within
the broader sample. This squares with the general fact that most world
trade is among OECD countries. Within the world sample, note that total
exports from non-OECD countries account for about two-thirds of all bi-
lateral trade “hits.” These summary statistics mask a lot of heterogeneity
across industries. Table 1.8 reports the mean thickness indexes for all
thirty-four industries for both the OECD and full-world samples. Over the
full time series, in both samples tobacco products is the thinnest market
(0.53 in the OECD, 0.07 in the world) while miscellaneous food products
is the thickest market (0.97 in the OECD, 0.31 in the world).
8. One concern we have in constructing our trade-thickness measures is whether the raw
data contain threshold levels of trade required for a nonzero entry and, relatedly, how these
threshold levels change over time. Any discrete changes in thresholds might cause discrete
changes in trade thickness. The available data documentation did not ﬂag any problems here,
but we highlight the issue nevertheless.
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try thickness measures and regressed them on a full set of industry dummy
variables (ID, which control for time-invariant diﬀerences in market inte-
gration across industries) and a time trend:
(3) ID   it i it te      ()       , =+ +
where eit is an additive error term. For both our thickness measures
(OECD and world) the time trend in equation (3) had a signiﬁcantly posi-
tive coeﬃcient estimate, suggesting that markets have been thickening over
time. Regressions with a time trend, however, do not allow us to see
whether the pace of integration has varied over time. To do this we replace
the time trend in equation (3) with a full set of time dummies (TD) and
estimate equation (3):
(3 ) ID TD ′ =++   it i t it u      ()   ( )    .
Table 1.9 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from
equation (3) using the world sample and all six thickness measures: those
from the OECD sample, those from the world sample, and the four world
components as described in equation (2). The key message of table 1.9 is
that the market-thickening process looked very diﬀerent in the 1970s and
1980s. During the 1970s the coeﬃcients on the time dummies increased
almost uniformly for all six thickness measures. This indicates that market
thickening proceeded continually throughout the 1970s.
The 1980s looked very diﬀerent, however. After 1979 the coeﬃcients on
the time dummies decreased for some time, and only after some additional
time did they return to their 1979 level. This suggests that market thick-
ening proceeded much less uniformly during the 1980s. The extent of this
thickening slowdown varies among thickness measures. Among the OECD
countries the slowdown lasted the shortest period: For the OECD-sample
it the time dummies return to their 1979 levels in 1984, and for ioot the
Table 1.7 Summary Statistics for Trade-Thickness Measures
Std.
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
it OECD 0.851 0.088 0.496 0.994
it World 0.200 0.054 0.061 0.362
ioot 0.029 0.003 0.017 0.034
iont 0.035 0.016 0.005 0.089
inot 0.082 0.018 0.028 0.122
innt 0.054 0.022 0.009 0.135
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: These variables are trade-thickness measures as deﬁned by equations (1) and (2) in the
text. The sample contains 782 observations (34 industries  23 years).
32 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughter1979 level held steady until 1985. Trade ﬂows involving non-OECD coun-
tries took longer to rebound—particularly exports from non-OECD coun-
tries. For the world-sample it the time dummies do not return to the 1979
level until 1988. The other three components of the world-sample it re-
turned as follows: iont 1986, inot 1989, and innt 1988. Figure 1.2 summa-
rizes the diﬀerence across decades for all manufacturing together by aver-
aging it across all thirty-four industries in each year. The rise in the 1970s
and subsequent stalling in the 1980s is clear. Figure 1.3 shows the same
Table 1.8 Average Trade-Thickness Measures by Industry
Industry Name it OECD it World
Grain-mill and bakery products 0.780 0.147
Beverages 0.832 0.162
Tobacco products 0.535 0.072
Miscellaneous food products 0.974 0.308
Apparel and textile products 0.967 0.307
Leather products 0.877 0.200
Pulp, paper, and board mills 0.801 0.168
Other paper products 0.834 0.177
Printing and publishing 0.874 0.188
Drugs 0.863 0.218
Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.789 0.153
Agricultural chemicals 0.672 0.145
Industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.914 0.258
Other chemical products 0.885 0.218
Rubber products 0.852 0.197
Miscellaneous plastic products 0.889 0.191
Ferrous metal products 0.836 0.182
Nonferrous metal products 0.908 0.219
Fabricated metal products 0.926 0.257
Farm and garden machinery 0.785 0.124
Construction, mining, and related machinery 0.836 0.189
Computer and oﬃce equipment 0.835 0.167
Other nonelectric machinery 0.932 0.278
Household appliances 0.841 0.177
Audio, video, and communication equipment 0.892 0.222
Electronic components and accessories 0.762 0.115
Other electrical machinery 0.897 0.236
Motor vehicles and equipment 0.858 0.228
Other transportation equipment 0.839 0.188
Lumber, wood, furniture, and ﬁxtures 0.857 0.214
Glass products 0.845 0.178
Stone, clay, and other mineral products 0.889 0.210
Instruments and related products 0.898 0.248
Other manufactures 0.948 0.254
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: These variables are average trade-thickness measures as deﬁned by equation (1) in the
text. The sample contains 782 observations (34 industries  23 years).
Measuring Product-Market Integration 33Fig. 1.2 World trade thickness: all manufacturing
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: Each year plots the thickness of world trade (as deﬁned in eq. [1]) averaged across all
thirty-four manufacturing industries.
Table 1.9 Time-Series Trends in Trade-Thickness Measures
it OECD it World ioot iont inot innt
1970 0.899 0.223 0.031 0.049 0.081 0.062
1971 0.909 0.227 0.031 0.050 0.082 0.064
1972 0.918 0.232 0.031 0.051 0.083 0.066
1973 0.933 0.239 0.032 0.054 0.085 0.068
1974 0.936 0.244 0.032 0.054 0.086 0.071
1975 0.933 0.246 0.032 0.055 0.087 0.073
1976 0.935 0.248 0.032 0.055 0.087 0.074
1977 0.935 0.253 0.032 0.056 0.089 0.076
1978 0.939 0.264 0.032 0.058 0.095 0.079
1979 0.942 0.265 0.032 0.059 0.095 0.079
1980 0.929 0.248 0.032 0.054 0.089 0.072
1981 0.933 0.248 0.032 0.055 0.089 0.072
1982 0.933 0.247 0.032 0.055 0.090 0.070
1983 0.936 0.244 0.032 0.055 0.089 0.068
1984 0.944 0.244 0.032 0.055 0.090 0.066
1985 0.951 0.249 0.033 0.056 0.092 0.068
1986 0.962 0.256 0.033 0.059 0.092 0.072
1987 0.971 0.263 0.033 0.061 0.094 0.075
1988 0.983 0.269 0.034 0.064 0.093 0.079
1989 0.989 0.275 0.034 0.064 0.095 0.081
1990 0.998 0.283 0.034 0.065 0.096 0.087
1991 1.001 0.284 0.034 0.065 0.095 0.089
1992 1.004 0.293 0.034 0.068 0.098 0.093
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: Each column is a diﬀerent trade-thickness measure as deﬁned in equations (1) and (2)
in the text. For each thickness measure, each row reports the coeﬃcient estimate on that
year’s time dummy variable from regression equation (3). All regressions contain 782 obser-
vations.pattern for a single industry, textiles and apparel. The pattern in this ﬁgure
is repeated in many other industries; altogether they give rise to ﬁgure 1.2.
In interpreting regression results from equation (3) as evidence of inte-
gration, we reiterate our caveat that our analysis does not link outcomes
back to trade barriers. Without these links we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that changes in outcomes are caused by forces other than declining
barriers, such as economic growth. To address this issue we reestimated
equation (3) by adding in additional regressors to control for forces aﬀect-
ing it other than declining barriers as proxied by time dummies. Our
choice of regressors, as with our empirical strategy more generally, does
not follow from a speciﬁc trade model. Instead, we chose measures aimed
at capturing cross-country diﬀerences in endowments, tastes, technology,
and the resulting international dispersion of production.
In table 1.10 we report estimation results for equation (3) augmented
by three alternative controls: cross-country dispersion in capital-to-labor
endowment ratios, cross-country dispersion in GDP per worker, and cross-
country dispersion in industry production. We intend for these three con-
trols to capture the role of endowments, of tastes and technology, and of
the equilibrium international dispersion of production, respectively. The
ﬁrst two controls vary only over time; both come from the Penn World
Tables assembled by Summers and Heston (1997). The third control is
from UNIDO (1995); it varies by both time and industry. For each control,
the dispersion of the variable of interest is constructed as the standard
deviation of the log of that variable calculated by pooling across the rele-
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Fig. 1.3 World trade thickness: textiles and apparel
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: Each year plots the thickness of world trade (as deﬁned in eq. [1]) for the textiles and
apparel industry.vant set of countries (i.e., the set of countries used in the thickness mea-
sure—either the OECD or the 122 countries in “the world”).9
Table 1.10 reports results for six regressions: three for the OECD and
three for the world, each estimates of equation (3) plus one of the control
regressors.10 The key message of this table is that the time-series patterns
in our thickness measures appear robust to controlling for other plausible
determinants of thickness. In all but one case, the general pattern remains
9. For our third control, the UNIDO data contain 28 three-digit International Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) manufacturing industries. Our thickness measures are con-
structed for the thirty-four BEA manufacturing industries. We matched the UNIDO indus-
tries to the BEA industries as best we could without a true concordance; accordingly, we
acknowledge that this procedure introduced some measurement error.
10. For the world sample, in the interest of brevity we report using just total world trade-
hits thickness measure—i.e., only the left-hand side of equation (2).
Table 1.10 Time-Series Trends in Trade-Thickness Measures: Speciﬁcations with Controls
it OECD it World
Per Capita Per Capita
Endowments GDP Output Endowments GDP Output
1970 n.a. n.a. 0.876 0.055 n.a. 0.232
1971 0.030 0.052 0.888 0.049 0.005 0.236
1972 0.058 0.086 0.898 0.042 0.007 0.240
1973 0.096 0.107 0.914 0.033 0.012 0.246
1974 0.118 0.129 0.918 0.026 0.017 0.251
1975 0.126 0.167 0.916 0.022 0.019 0.253
1976 0.139 0.182 0.917 0.019 0.018 0.255
1977 0.148 0.207 0.918 0.012 0.024 0.260
1978 0.168 0.205 0.922 0.001 0.036 0.270
1979 0.180 0.200 0.926 0.006 0.037 0.272
1980 0.174 0.182 0.914 0.008 0.012 0.254
1981 0.184 0.186 0.917 0.006 0.017 0.255
1982 0.189 0.200 0.917 0.007 0.018 0.253
1983 0.196 0.204 0.919 0.011 0.016 0.251
1984 0.205 0.200 0.927 0.013 0.015 0.251
1985 0.209 0.209 0.935 0.011 0.024 0.256
1986 0.220 0.235 0.947 0.002 0.029 0.263
1987 0.229 0.260 0.956 0.001 0.036 0.269
1988 0.241 0.268 0.968 0.001 0.039 0.275
1989 0.252 0.282 0.974 0.007 0.044 0.281
1990 0.263 0.341 0.982 0.012 0.055 0.290
1991 0.294 n.a. 0.986 0.002 n.a. 0.291
1992 0.339 n.a. 0.988 n.a. n.a. 0.300
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997), Summers and Heston (1997), UNIDO (1995).
Note: Each column is a diﬀerent trade-thickness measure as deﬁned in equation (1) in the text. For
each thickness measure, each row reports the coeﬃcient estimate on that year’s time dummy variable
from regression equation (3), expanded to include the control regressor. Exact deﬁnitions of control
variables are given in the text. All regressions contain 782 observations. n.a.  not available.
36 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughterof rising thickness over the 1970s followed by a decline and then recovery
in thickness over part or most of the 1980s. Only for the OECD sample
using endowment dispersion do we ﬁnd a much shorter decline period. As
for the controls, both endowment and per capita GDP dispersion were
very signiﬁcantly positive in all speciﬁcations. The industry-output control
was signiﬁcantly positive at the 10 percent level for the OECD sample, but
signiﬁcantly negative at that level for the world sample.
Finally, table 1.11 reports how the worldwide trade thickening from
1970 to 1992 was allocated across the four components in equation (2).
For each of the four components table 1.11 reports the level in 1970 and
1992, the level change between 1970 and 1992, and ﬁnally the share of the
total level change in it accounted for by that component, all averaged in
each year across the thirty-four industries. Slightly less than half of the
total increase in it was accounted for by trade among non-OECD coun-
tries. About 28 percent was accounted for by exports from the OECD to
non-OECD countries, while another 22 percent was accounted for by trade
in the other direction. Only about 5 percent of the total increase was ac-
counted for by trade among OECD countries.
1.4.2 The Geographic Dispersion of Production
Our second quantity-based integration measure is the degree of produc-
tion concentration worldwide, measured with industry-year Herﬁndahl in-
dexes of production. Let Xjit be the output of country j in industry i at time
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By construction, HerfXit ranges from zero to one. It equals one if a
single country produces all the world’s output in some industry-year, and
it approaches zero as world production is spread evenly across all coun-
tries. In a standard HO model HerfXit should increase with integration
as world production becomes more specialized according to comparative
Table 1.11 Changes in World Trade Thickness
Thickness Measure ioot iont inot innt
Level in 1970 0.028 0.028 0.074 0.044
Level in 1992 0.031 0.048 0.090 0.075
Change in level, 1970–92 0.003 0.020 0.016 0.031
Share of 	it world 0.054 0.284 0.223 0.439
Source: Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Note: These levels and changes for each measure are averaged across all 34 industries in the
sample. The thickness measures are deﬁned in equation (2).
Measuring Product-Market Integration 37advantage. In an HO-fragmentation world HerfXit might decline as pro-
duction activities within industries spread across more countries. To con-
struct HerfXit we use data from UNIDO (1995) covering the 28 three-digit
ISIC manufacturing industries from 1970 through 1992, with “the world”
deﬁned as all countries with output data available for all twenty-three
years of the sample. We have information on both value added and gross
output; for completeness we use both, and thus measure Xjit in terms of
either value added or gross output.11
Table 1.12 reports summary statistics for the two Herﬁndahl indexes.
Note that, on average, HerfXit is slightly larger for value-added output
than for gross output. To see how these indexes evolved over time we
pooled all observations and regressed each HerfXit on a full set of industry
dummy variables (which control for time-invariant diﬀe r e n c e si nm a r k e t
integration across industries) and a time trend:
(5) Herf ID Xt e it i it =+ +  ()       ,
where eit is an additive error term. For both our output measures the time
trend in equation (5) had a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient estimate, sug-
gesting that world production has become less concentrated over time. As
before, however, regressions with a time trend do not allow us to see
whether the pace of integration has varied over time. To do this we esti-
mate equation (6).
(6) Herf ID TD Xu it i t it =+ +  ()   ( )    ,
where, as before, TD is a full set of time dummies.
Table 1.13 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from
equation (6) for both measures of HerfXit. For each measure, table 1.13
also reports results for equation (6) modiﬁed by adding the world-
endowment-dispersion control. As with trade thickness, here, too, the
11. Strictly speaking, the standard HO model refers to industry net outputs. We have data
on value added and gross output, and we assume that the Herﬁndahl indexes rise for these
output measures whenever it rises in terms of net output.
Table 1.12 Summary Statistics for World Production Dispersion
Std.
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Value-added HerfXit 0.164 0.063 0.064 0.465
Gross-output HerfXit 0.133 0.045 0.056 0.346
Source: UNIDO (1995).
Note: These variables are Herﬁndahl indexes of production dispersion as deﬁned by equation
(4) in the text. The sample contains 644 observations (28 industries  23 years).
38 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughter1970s and 1980s look diﬀerent. Both measures of HerfXit had uniformly
declining time dummies during the 1970s. But this trend reversed after
1980, with the time dummies increasing for several years before coming
down again. This pattern holds even controlling for the world distribution
of endowments (similar results were obtained using the other controls de-
scribed earlier; for brevity we omit these). Figure 1.4 displays the diﬀerence
across decades for all manufacturing together by averaging the gross-
output HerfXit across all twenty-eight industries in each year. The fall in
the 1970s and subsequent stalling in the 1980s is clear.
What these time-series patterns in HerfXit say about integration depends
on which framework is applied. From the standard HO perspective the
patterns suggest no integration in the 1970s, then greater integration in the
1980s. From the HO-fragmentation perspective the opposite is suggested:
marked integration during the 1970s and then very little integration in the
Table 1.13 Time-Series Trends in World Production Dispersion
Gross-Output HerfXit Value-Added HerfXit
None Endowments None Endowments
1970 0.233 0.081 0.255 0.078
1971 0.214 0.063 0.250 0.074
1972 0.206 0.057 0.242 0.067
1973 0.195 0.046 0.222 0.048
1974 0.185 0.038 0.211 0.038
1975 0.179 0.032 0.198 0.027
1976 0.181 0.035 0.205 0.034
1977 0.174 0.030 0.206 0.036
1978 0.171 0.027 0.203 0.035
1979 0.164 0.022 0.197 0.031
1980 0.157 0.018 0.181 0.017
1981 0.166 0.027 0.196 0.033
1982 0.167 0.028 0.200 0.037
1983 0.171 0.031 0.203 0.039
1984 0.172 0.031 0.209 0.044
1985 0.172 0.030 0.210 0.044
1986 0.159 0.018 0.192 0.026
1987 0.158 0.014 0.193 0.024
1988 0.156 0.009 0.187 0.016
1989 0.152 0.009 0.185 0.013
1990 0.154 0.006 0.180 0.006
1991 0.148 0.006 0.181 0.000
1992 0.160 n.a. 0.187 n.a.
Source: UNIDO (1995) and Summers and Heston (1997).
Note: Each column is a Herﬁndahl index of production dispersion as deﬁned in equation (4)
in the text. For each dispersion measure, each row reports the coeﬃcient estimate on that
year’s time dummy variable from regression equation (6). Exact deﬁnition of control variable
is given in the text. All regressions contain 644 observations. n.a.  not available.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 391980s. We note that this latter interpretation is consistent with the trade-
thickness evidence.
1.4.3 Production Fragmentation: Evidence from
Value-Added and Gross Output
Our ﬁnal quantity-based integration measure is the ratio of value added
to gross output (VAGO) within industries. With the UNIDO data we can
construct this ratio for each industry-year, VAGOit, again for all 28 three-
digit ISIC manufacturing industries from 1970 through 1992. In the full
sample, VAGOit had a mean value of 0.376 (with a standard deviation of
0.102). In the HO-fragmentation world, with integration VAGOit should
decline as countries focus on narrower mixes of activities within industries
and import other activities as intermediate inputs. To test this we estimate
(7) VAGO ID TD it i t it u =+ +  ()   ( )    ,
where, as before, TD is a full set of time dummies. An important data
caveat here is that VAGOit can change because of changing reliance on
domestic intermediate inputs, not just foreign inputs. We have no data on
imported intermediate inputs; our results should be interpreted accord-
ingly.
Table 1.14 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from
equation (7); it also reports results for equation (7) modiﬁed by adding
the world-endowment-dispersion control. Again the 1970s and 1980s look
diﬀerent. With or without the control for endowments, the time dummies
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Fig. 1.4 World production dispersion: all manufacturing
Source: UNIDO (1995).
Note: Each year plots the dispersion of world production (as deﬁned in eq. [4]) averaged
across all twenty-eight manufacturing industries.in equation (7) generally declined during the 1970s, then plateaued during
the 1980s and increased sharply the last few years. Figure 1.5 displays
these trends by averaging VAGOit across all twenty-eight industries in each
year. The fall in the 1970s and subsequent stalling is clear.
1.4.4 Summary of Quantity Evidence
Viewed from the HO-fragmentation perspective, our quantity evidence
suggests that product markets have integrated since 1970 but at quite
diﬀerent rates over time. There was sizable, steady integration during the
1970s. The 1980s had very little integration overall: Integration actually
reversed initially, only to recover this reversal by the end of the decade.
We note that these decade diﬀerences broadly match the trend in U.S.
natural trade barriers shown in ﬁgure 1.1. These diﬀerences also have a
parallel in the recent product-price studies linking rising U.S. wage in-
equality with Stolper-Samuelson price eﬀects. The consensus of these stud-
ies is that during the 1970s the U.S. relative price of unskilled-labor-

























Source: UNIDO (1995) and Summers and Heston (1997).
Note: Each row reports the coeﬃcient estimate on that year’s time dummy variable from
regression equation (7), where the dependent variable is the ratio of value added to gross
output. Exact deﬁnition of control variable is given in the text. All regressions contain 644
observations. n.a.  not available.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 41intensive products declined, but that this decline did not continue during
the 1980s. These price changes suggest that the U.S. economy liberalized
during the 1970s but not in the 1980s—a split in timing that matches our
quantity evidence.
In interpreting these integration measures, we reiterate our position that
these measures do not link outcomes back to trade barriers. Without these
links we cannot rule out the possibility that forces other than declining
barriers, such as economic growth, drove the changes in outcomes. In our
analysis we have included some ﬁrst-pass controls for these other forces,
such as cross-country dispersion of endowments and per capita income.
Our outcomes-based integration measures look quite similar either way,
so these measures hopefully relate to the underlying integration process.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some new price- and quantity-based
measures of product-market integration. Our price measures do not per-
mit very strong conclusions about the changing nature of market integra-
tion. Both the absolute and relative price information available does con-
ﬁrm that European countries seem to be moving toward a single market.
There is little to suggest convergence toward common prices among Eu-
rope and the United States or the United Kingdom, however. We have
limited price data on linkages between developed and developing coun-
tries. The developing-country evidence is mixed: Some countries seem to
42 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughter
Fig. 1.5 World (value added/gross output): all manufacturing
Source: UNIDO (1995).
Note: Each year plots the ratio of value added to gross output averaged across all twenty-
eight manufacturing industries.converge in relative prices but others do not. Our quantity evidence sug-
gests that product markets have integrated since 1970, but at quite diﬀer-
ent rates over time. There was sizable, steady integration during the 1970s.
But the 1980s had much less integration overall: It reversed initially and
then recovered.
These new measures we regard as a ﬁrst step in trying to quantify more
accurately the process of product-market integration. We have tried to use
data that are readily available to other researchers, to permit further steps
in this direction. With reﬁnement, we think measures such as these will
help researchers understand the links between integration and domestic-
economy outcomes.
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Comment James Harrigan
“Everyone knows” that product markets have become more internation-
ally integrated in recent decades: Trade has grown faster than output,
trade barriers and transport costs have fallen, and the word “globaliza-
tion” has become almost as ubiquitous as the word “Lewinsky.” Knetter
and Slaughter’s contribution in this paper is to try to conﬁrm this conven-
tional wisdom, and in the process they show how diﬃcult it is to do so.
Rather than looking directly at the trends in trade and communications
costs that are widely thought to be causing globalization, the authors look
instead at outcomes. The main advantage of this strategy is pragmatic:
Trade ﬂows and international prices are easier to measure than trade and
communications costs.1 A crucial disadvantage, which the authors ac-
knowledge, is that outcomes may change for reasons unrelated to changes
in trade costs. This makes it important to control for the other determi-
nants of changes in trade ﬂows and international prices, but Knetter and
Slaughter make only limited eﬀorts in this regard.
Prices
Knetter and Slaughter have three types of price data: export unit values,
the prices of a bad food and a good magazine, and relative internal prices
from the International Comparisons Program (ICP).
Turning ﬁrst to the export unit-value data, they ask, “Has dispersion of
prices for the ‘same’ good decreased over time?” The answer appears to
be no. The key problem here is the usual problem with unit values: If the
composition of the category changes, then changes in its unit value only
partially reﬂect changes in prices of speciﬁc goods. Nevertheless, the fail-
ure of unit-value dispersion to fall is weak evidence that barriers to arbi-
trage are still big enough to matter. This is not to say that resale costs
haven’t fallen, since a decline in costs from “prohibitive” to “half as big,
but still prohibitive” will not show up in the data used here.
T h ed a t ao nB i gM a c sa n dThe Economist don’t suﬀer from comparabil-
ity problems, but price diﬀerences surely reﬂect continuing high resale
costs. No imaginable decline in transport costs will lead to Big Mac arbi-
James Harrigan is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a
faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. For some painstaking work on direct measurement of these costs, see Hummels
(1999a, 1999b).
44 Michael M. Knetter and Matthew J. Slaughtertrage, and the timeliness of a weekly magazine makes it unlikely that arbi-
trage of The Economist will ever be proﬁtable. The authors state that easier
tradability of inputs should lead to price convergence in nontraded goods
even if resale costs are prohibitive, but this is true only if the traded compo-
nent of marginal costs is high and demand elasticities are similar across
markets.2 I conclude that the data on Big Macs and The Economist shed
little light on product-market integration.
The ICP data are not ideal, primarily because they are ﬁnal customer
prices and therefore reﬂect diﬀerences in internal taxes and distribution
margins across countries. The authors’ methodology is also not ideal:
Their conclusions depend on the base country, and they weight all goods
equally. Nevertheless, some of the results are striking: Relative prices
within continental Europe are very similar, and it appears that relative
prices are becoming more similar among richer countries generally.
Quantities
In addition to price data, Knetter and Slaughter look at three types of
quantity data: the number of bilateral trade ﬂows, the dispersion of indus-
try output levels, and the value-added share of gross output by industry.
If there are ﬁxed costs to trade, then the number of bilateral trade ﬂows
in the world will increase if these costs fall, holding the distribution of
output and demand ﬁxed. The authors show that “market thickness” has
increased over time, and this inference holds regardless of whether controls
for output or demand are included in the analysis. This seems like solid
evidence of increased market integration.
The second quantity analysis looks at the dispersion of production
across countries using Herﬁndahl indexes. The motivation of this analysis
is unclear, since the authors acknowledge that integration has no particu-
lar implications for the dispersion of production. As a tool for analyzing
dispersion, a drawback of the Herﬁndahl index is that its value will change
if relative country sizes change, even if the composition of outputs within
each country stays constant. Expressing outputs as a share of GDP, and
looking at diﬀerences in the output mix across countries, would address
this shortcoming of the Herﬁndahl index.
The ﬁnal data analysis tries to address the “production fragmentation”
or “outsourcing” phenomenon by looking at trends in the ratio of value
added to gross output: This may fall as fragmentation increases. As the
authors recognize, however, fragmentation may increase with no increase
in international integration, which means that the analysis sheds little light
on the subject of the paper.
2. This is true unless nontraded prices are determined by traded prices in general equilib-
rium, as will be the case if there is perfect competition in all markets and at least as many
traded goods/factors as there are nontraded goods/factors.
Measuring Product-Market Integration 45Conclusion
Of the six data analyses in the paper, two oﬀer the most direct evidence
of increased product-market integration: the ICP price data and the “mar-
ket thickness” quantity data. The paper makes a contribution to a small
but growing literature on measuring product-market integration, and the
authors deserve credit for their contribution as well as for forthrightly ac-
knowledging the limitations of their analysis.
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